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Abstract 
This paper studies the competition between two chain stores when consumers possess heterogeneous 
information on the price distribution. We enrich the frameworks in Varian (1980) and Baye et al. (1992) 
by allowing the firms to decide on the number of outlets and to set possibly different prices for each of its 
outlets. A portion of the uninformed consumers are evenly distributed among all outlets as in Varian 
(1980) and the rest of the uninformed consumers, similar to that in Baye et al. (1992)，select and visit an 
outlet based on their belief on the prices in the outlets. 
We study the set of subgame perfect equilibria and find that a chain store will randomly choose a 
single outlet to offer discount while charging the monopoly price in all other outlets in equilibrium. The 
price discount is driven by the competition for informed consumers, and the outlets charging the 
monopoly price are patronized by uninformed consumers. We also show that lack of knowledge of 
uninformed consumers about the price distribution in outlets intensifies price competition and increases 
the number of outlets of the chain stores. Therefore, no obfuscation will be pursued by the firms to 
undermine such knowledge. However, a firm may have incentive to operate additional outlets as a vehicle 




(1980)和Baye et al. (1992)的理論框架上作出擴展，以容許連鎖店決定銷售點數目及每個銷售點 
所標示的價格。此外，在缺乏完整價格資訊的消費者當中，一部份會平均分佈於各個銷售點，而 
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1 Introduction 
This study aims to address the relation between the prices in the outlets of a chain store^. 
Casual observation seems to suggest that retail chain stores tend to charge the same prices in all 
their stores. This fact stands in stark contrast with the price dispersion literature, which documents 
significant price differential among sellers even after controlling for their observable d i f f e r e n c e s ^ . 
Such evidence rules out the hypothesis that varying price among the branches will result in no sales 
in the stores with higher price. It is natural to speculate whether chain stores really offer the same 
prices in all their stores and if so, why. Specifically, what is the optimal pricing scheme for a chain 
store if all the stores share the same cost structure and demand? 
Our study addresses this question from a theoretical perspective. We consider a model setting 
in which price dispersion arises in equilibrium. Otherwise, the results will be trivial: either the 
goods will be priced at marginal cost or the heterogeneity among the goods dictates the variation in 
prices. This setting illustrates the connection between our study and the models on price dispersion. 
However, the existing price search models, unlike our setting, assume each firm sets one price only. 
Our analysis is not restricted merely to the physical marketplace but is conducted in a more 
general setting. We define any unit where consumers obtain a price quote and make purchase as 
an outlet. An outlet can be narrowly visualized as a physical store or broadly understood as an 
identity and contact methods of the seller�. For brevity, the terminology "chain store" refers to a 
firm with multiple outlets even if it operates no tangible branches. 
For tractability, we consider a duopoly model with two chain stores that decide its number of 
outlets. Following Varian (1980) and Baye et al. (1992), chain stores share identical production 
technology, and the consumers are endowed with heterogeneous information on the price distri-
ITO the author's best knowledge, there are no previous works on this research question. 
2 See Baye et al. (2006) for a survey of theoretical models and empirical results. 
3 For example, a firm may provide different contact channels, perhaps with different company titles, in several 
advertisements. A seller may market a product in his own website while listing it in eBay under a different identity. 
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bution. The informed consumers possess information of the price in every outlet, whereas the 
uninformed consumers do not and visit one outlet only. Among these uninformed consumers, the 
sophisticated type, such as that considered in Baye et al. (1992), knows the distribution of prices 
in the outlets, whereas the naive type randomly visits an outlet, as that in Varian (1980). Under 
this setting, the firms will compete for both informed consumers and sophisticated uninformed 
consumers. We study the equilibrium pricing strategy of the chain stores and their optimal number 
of outlets. 
Our primary result is that with the presence of all three types of consumers, the optimal pricing 
strategy of a chain store is to offer discount in exactly one outlet, termed "store on sales", while 
charging a monopoly price in all other outlets, regardless of the relative population sizes of the 
consumers of various types. The price discount is offered to compete for informed consumers, and 
the outlets charging monopoly price profit from the purchase by uninformed consumers. 
We characterize the set of equilibria in which the "store on sales" and the price discount of a firm 
are independent so that our results hold for a wide class of consumer preference. In these equilibria, 
when the firms operate different numbers of outlets, the sophisticated uninformed consumers will 
discriminate between the outlets operated by the two chain stores. Such differentiation lessens the 
intensity of price competition between the firms. 
In the setting in which almost all uninformed consumers are naive, the subgame perfect equi-
librium is generically unique and symmetric. Competition for the share of uninformed consumers 
resembles the Cournot competition and drives the firms' decision on the number of outlets. The 
two firms will operate multiple outlets if the cost of doing so is not prohibitively high. Thus, prices 
vary across outlets. 
Under the setting that almost all the uninformed consumers select the outlet according to the 
associated price distribution, the outlet solely serves as a device to conceal discount offer. When the 
portion of informed consumers is within certain range, the two firms will operate different numbers 
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of outlets to soften the price competition. One firm will operate two outlets to randomize its 
choice of "store on sale" evenly over its outlets, concealing the discount offer from the uninformed 
consumers. This firm will offer a deeper price discount at the same time, thus having a greater 
probability of seizing the informed consumers. The other firm will operate a single outlet and enjoy 
the patronage of almost all uninformed consumers. 
Comparing these two benchmark settings, we find that when the uninformed consumers choose 
the outlet based on the associated price distribution, the firms will earn a higher profit because 
of the reduction in the number of outlets and potential moderation of price competition. Hence, 
any obfuscation behavior to distort consumers from knowing the price distribution is detrimental 
to the firms. 
In Section 2，we briefly reviews the selected literature on price dispersion and obfuscation. We 
also discuss the relation of our work to the existing literature and motivate our study. Our model 
setting is detailed in Section 3. In Section 4, we study the set of equilibria in the price competition, 
and in Section 5, we discuss the equilibrium number of outlets operated by the firms. In Section 6， 
we discuss the incentive for the firms to obstruct uninformed consumers from knowing about the 
price distributions in outlets. Section 7 concludes the study. All the proofs are presented in the 
Appendix. 
2 Literature Review 
Following the seminal article "The Economics of Information" by Stigler, the ubiquity of price 
dispersion is well-documented in the literature, and models have been put forward to account 
for this phenomenon. Varian (1980) studies the symmetric Nash Equilibria in a model of sales 
in which the consumer search behavior is exogenously given. There is a finite number of firms 
with identical production cost functions and two types of consumers. The informed consumers 
always shop at where the lowest price is offered, whereas the uninformed consumers visit one 
3 
firm only and randomize their choices among the firms with equal probability. The decision of 
information acquisition is endogenized by assuming that the consumers face heterogeneous cost to 
become informed. Price dispersion arises in equilibrium even though the production functions are 
homogeneous among firms. 
Varian (1980) distinguishes between spatial and temporal dimensions of price dispersion. It is 
criticized that all the price search models assuming heterogeneous production costs [cf. Macminn 
(1980)，Carlson and McAfee (1983)] lead to spatial dispersion, such that some firms consistently 
charge more than the others. This outcome is untenable if the consumers learn the price distribution 
over time. In contrast, firms with identical production functions randomize their prices to avoid a 
systematic undercut by rival firms. Hence, temporal price dispersion arises as the firms employ the 
same mixed strategy for pricing. In the light of this, we consider homogeneous production costs in 
our study. 
Noting the existence of asymmetric equilibria in the model of sales, Baye et al. (1992) aug-
ments the framework in Varian (1980). It is assumed that firms set their prices and the uninformed 
consumers choose the firm simultaneously so that the firms' strategies are incorporated into the 
uninformed consumers' decision making. This modification embodies Varian's argument that con-
sumers learn the price distribution over time without an explicit model for the learning process. 
Furthermore, the Nash Equilibrium in the modified game is unique, and the behavior of consumers 
and firms coincides with that of the symmetric equilibrium in Varian (1980)4. 
The existing models on price dispersion assume that each firm charges a single price only. In 
our formulation, this "single price-setting" assumption corresponds with the case where the firm 
operates exactly one outlet or is bound to adopt the same price across all its outlets. In other words, 
we enrich the price search literature by allowing the firms to decide on the number of outlets and 
to set possibly different prices for each of its outlets. 
^The term "behavior" but not "strategies" is used because consumer behavior is directly assumed in Varian (1980). 
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Apart from the empirical relevance of chain stores, the significance of our proposed modification 
also stems from its implications on the competition among firms as well as on the consumers' 
decision. In contrast to the price setting across firms, the outlets operated by the same chain store 
share aligned interest and information about the price offers. Therefore, a chain store may improve 
its profit by coordinating prices among its outlets. As the strategy space of a chain store's pricing 
scheme depends on its number of outlets, an outlet also serves as a vehicle of coordination. These 
two dimensions of optimal price coordination are the primary focus of our paper®. 
On the other side, consumer knowledge about the price distribution in individual outlets is a 
critical determinant of the equilibrium outcome. The difference between the sets of equilibria in 
Varian (1980) and Baye et al. (1992) can be attributed to the fact that the uninformed consumers 
in the former do not know the distribution of prices offered by the firms, whereas those in the latter 
do. 
Alternatively, this distinction can be interpreted as whether the search order is randomly given 
or endogenously determined. Another example is Burdett and Smith (2010) which study the effect 
of market power on firms' pricing strategy®. They consider a continuum of identical consumers 
conducting noisy sequential search with random search order?. A large firm operates a positive 
measure of outlets, and a continuum of small firms owns a single outlet. However, the large firm in 
Burdett and Smith (2010) is conceptually different from the chain store in our formulation. Their 
analysis requires every firm to set one price only; thus, the difference between the large firm and 
small firms lies entirely in the chance that the price quote is received by a consumer. Despite 
the homogeneity of production technology across firms, the large firm offers consumers' reservation 
5 Our study focus on the cross-sectional price coordination in the outlets of a chain store. Unlike Salop and Stiglitz 
(1982)，we assume no inter-temporal linkage between consumer purchases in our model. 
6 To the auhor's best knowledge, Burdett and Smith (2010) is the only study in the price dispersion literature that 
considers a firm with multiple stores. 
7Noisy sequential search is a variant of sequential search first introduced in Burdett and Judd (1983). In this ap-
proach, there is an exogenous probability distribution on the number of price quotes received whenever the consumers 
conduct a search. 
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price, whereas other small firms charge a price lower than that of the large firm almost surely in 
equilibrium. This result hinges on the assumption of random search order, and the equilibrium 
outcome is implausible if the consumers learn the price distribution of individual outlets over time. 
The variation in the assumption on consumer knowledge about the price distribution in indi-
vidual outlets is open to several interpretations. In the context of bounded rationality, we may 
assume that some consumers are simply sophisticated enough to infer the pricing strategy of the 
firms, while some cannot. With reference to the consumers' learning argument, the consumers 
should know the price distribution in the outlets in a repeated instance but not in a one-shot game. 
Another plausible interpretation is the information structure of the market. When the consumers 
fail to distinguish between the outlets, they cannot infer the price distribution of an outlet from 
the firms' strategies, and the search order becomes irrelevant. However, suppose that the outlet 
ownership is publicly observable so that the consumers can learn the price distribution of individual 
outlets. Then, the outlets are distinguishable alternatives, and the choice of outlet is introduced 
into the search decision. 
Unlike the first two interpretations, the information structure of the market may be endoge-
nously determined within the model. Suppose the firms engage in obfuscation to distort the con-
sumer learning or to mask the outlet ownership. Then, the random search order would be a 
reasonable setting®. Generally, the firms may selectively conceal their ownership of a fraction of 
their outlets from a specific group of consumers. For simplicity, we only consider the setting in 
which either all the outlets are discernible or are completely indistinguishable to a consumer. When 
the outlets are distinguishable, the number of the outlets of a firm conveys information about the 
price distributions of its outlets, accounting for the differences of our results from those in Baye et 
al. (1992). This information content must not be confused with other factors accompanying the 
8There are many ways to achieve this in an online market. In physical markets, say, a one-shot game context like 
a festival bazaar, such practices may require a firm to assign its booths different names. In the context of repeated 
situations, this can be done by relocation, redecoration, and renaming of the physical stores or by advertisng the 
products under different company titles and contacts. .. 
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number of outlets, such as economies of scale, brand loyalty and signal about quality. 
Although we lean towards the information structure interpretation, the terms "sophisticated" 
and "naive" may sound more intuitive to potential readers and are used to refer the consumers 
with knowledge about the price distribution in individual outlets and those do not, respectively. 
In addition to the potential incentive to undermine consumers' information of price distribution, 
the outlets can be considered as obfuscation devices used by a firm to hinder the uninformed 
consumers from finding out its lowest price offer. In this sense, our study also contributes to the 
growing literature on the obfuscation behavior of firms in the presence of consumer search cost. 
Most obfuscation literature directly models the results of obfuscation but does not study or 
differentiate the devices employed by the firms. For example, the firms in Carlin (2008) influence 
the size of informed consumers in the model of sales. The search cost incurred by the visiting 
consumers is partially determined by the firm in Ellison and Wolitzky (2009) and Wilson (2010). 
In contrast, we investigate the price coordination as a means for a chain store to conceal its price 
offer from the uninformed consumers, leading to a sharp and readily testable prediction on the 
behavior pursued by the firms. Such explicit approach is also adopted in Ellison (2005) which 
studies the firms' incentive to advertise the price of add-on in addition to that of the base good. 
As we will show that the chain stores do not seek to undermine uninformed consumers' knowledge 
about the price distribution in outlets, we do not pursue an explicit model for obfuscation of such 
kind. 
Furthermore, suppose a consumer engages in sequential search among discernible outlets. As 
the prices in different outlets of the same firm are generally interdependent, a price quote not 
only represents an option to purchase the good at the specified price but also provides information 
about the prices in other outlets operated by the same firm. A rational consumer revises his 
belief of the prices in other outlets of the same firm every time after visiting an outlet. The 
search strategy of a consumer is then a mapping from the list of visited outlets and the associated 
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price into the set of all outlets and the purchase decision. The general problem of optimal search 
among heterogeneous alternatives with dynamic learning is found to be analytically intractable®. In 
addition, the distributions of search outcomes are endogenously determined in our model, further 
complicating the problem^^. 
One way to circumvent this problem is to render such information worthless through restrictions 
on the parameter values. We provide an example based on Stahl (1989). There is a positive mass 
of costless consumers facing no search cost at all. The rest are costly consumers who receive 
their first price quote for free and incur a positive search cost for each additional quote. We 
assume a prohibitively high search cost which amounts exceeds the difference between their marginal 
valuation and the marginal cost of the good. In this case, the information value of the first price 
quote will be completely eroded because it is always the only price quote obtained by a costly 
consumer. 
As the costless and costly consumers in the sequential search model discussed mirror the in-
formed and uninformed consumers in the model of sales, respectively, the two approaches produce 
the same set of results. Therefore, we omit the information content of a price quote and employ 
the model of sales framework for simplicity. 
3 Model Setting 
We consider a duopoly model with risk neutral firms A and B. The two firms produce homoge-
neous and indivisible goods at constant cost c. The goods are sold to the consumers via the firms' 
outlets. The firms decide on the number of outlets li, with each outlet costing the firm amount 
9 For search among heterogeneous alternatives with learning, Adam (2001) provides the optimal rule for a special 
class of distributions. The optimal search procedure for general distributions remains an open question. 
10 The intractability of the search model with learning is well-noted in the price search literature. Carlson and 
McAfee (1983) circumvent the problem of search with dynamic learning by assuming that consumers conduct random 
search among all the firms, including those they visited but decided not to purchase. In other words, consumer search 
is assumed to be history-independent or memory less. Stahl (1989) charaterizes the set of symmetric Nash Equilibiria 
only because the case of asymmetric equilibrium involves dynamic updating of price belief. 
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iiT > 0. The constant cost function is used to avoid the effect of production technology on the 
equilibrium outcome. The firms are assumed to set prices after deciding on the number of outlets, 
as price adjustment usually takes less timeii. 
There is a unit measure of consumers with unit demand and reservation price r. The consumers 
come in three types. The behavior of each type of consumers is exogenously given and described 
as follows. 
Definition 1 Informed consumers only purchase from the outlet offering the lowest price; their 
share is denoted by I E (0，1). In case multiple outlets are offering the lowest price, we assume that 
the informed consumer will randomly patronize one of them with equal probability^'^. 
Definition 2 Naive uninformed consumers are evenly distributed among the outlets regardless of 
the distribution of prices; their share is (1 — I)S, where S € (0,1). 
Definition 3 Sophisticated uninformed consumers choose the outlet they will visit based on their 
belief about the prices in the outlets; their share is (1 - /)(1 — S). 
The sequence of moves is as follows: 
Stage 1: The firms decide on the number of outlets they operate simultaneously 
Stage 2: The two firms set prices for each outlet and sophisticated uninformed consumers choose 
the outlet they will visit simultaneously. Afterwards, the consumers visit the outlets according 
to their type and make a purchase if the price does not exceed r. 
Suppose that firm i has li>l outlets in stage 2. Let pj denote the price offered by firm f's j-th 
outlet, where i e {A,B} and j = 1,2,.. . ’ /“ and P^ denote the price vector > 0. Firm 
11 For example, an outlet may be established by opening a retail branch, advertising a contact method, or setting 
up a new website. These activities usually require more time than price resetting. 
12 Our findings are insensitive to the tie-breaking rule, as Lemma 2 states that such event is of zero probability in •. 
any equilibrium. 
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i's strategy is represented by a c.d.f. F^(P^) = ..,pf.) on P\ For every firm i's strategy 
F^(P^), a marginal distribution for the price in each of its outlet pj is induced. We denote its c.d.f. 
by Fj (p). The minimum element of P* is denoted by pj^ i^  and F^n(p) denotes the associated c.d.f. 
induced by F^(P^). pmin is the lower value of p ^ and p ^ 
S € (0，1) is assumed to lessen the multiplicity of equilibria in stage 2，substantially simplifying 
our analysis. The assumption 5 > 0 drives the firm to set pJ = r in the outlets patronized by no 
sophisticated uninformed consumers, and the assumption 1 > S potentially imposes some degree 
of symmetry in the distribution of prices in the outlets of the same chain store. The settings in 
Varian (1980) and Baye et al. (1992) correspond to cases 5 = 1 and S = 0, respectively. A refined 
set of equilibria of these two cases can be obtained by setting 5 —> 1~ and 0+. We will address 
the cases 5 = 1 and 5 = 0 further in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, respectively. 
The strategy of a sophisticated uninformed consumer is the outlet he will soon visit. As sophis-
ticated uninformed consumers choose the outlet simultaneously with the price setting of firms, their 
strategy must be optimal with regard to their belief about prices in individual outlets^^. To pre-
serve generality, we only assume that a consumer's Bernoulli utility function is strictly decreasing 
in price. Equivalently, we can assume that sophisticated uninformed consumers choose the outlet 
according to the Strict First-order Stochastic Dominance Criterion as in Baye et al. (1992) 
Definition 4 Xp is said to Strictly First-order Stochastic Dominates (henceforth abbreviated as 
FSD) Xq if F{x) < G{x) for all x and strict equality holds for some x. 
It is never optimal for a sophisticated uninformed consumer to visit an outlet he believes the 
price strictly FSD that of another outlet '^^ . 
i3The timing of sophisticated uninformed consumers' decisions follows the setting in Baye et al. (1992). Compared 
to directly assuming that these consumers know the price distribution of every outlet, the setting here not only 
endows the sophisticated uninformed consumers with such information but also implicitly assumes that they will not 
react to any deviation by firms. Both implications are required for our results. 
The preference represented by the Strict FSD criterion is incomplete such that two outlets may have different 
price distributions but neither price strictly FSD the other. In such case, the optimal choice of outlet depends on “ 
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As all sophisticated uninformed consumers are homogeneous, their strategies can be aggregated 
into a vector indicating the share of sophisticated uninformed consumers patronizing the outlets. 
We denote the share of sophisticated uninformed consumers patronizing firm i's j-th. outlet by U�, 
where E Uf + E Uf = 1. 
Using this notation, the vector U = may be considered a mixed strategy of a 
representative sophisticated uninformed consumer, where U�represents the probability that he will 
visit the j-th outlet operated by firm i. As the firms are risk-neutral, distinguishing between pure 
strategies and mixed strategies of the consumers is pointless. We simply refer to C/" as a distribution 
of the sophisticated uninformed consumers. 
Only the sets of prices offered by the two firms are relevant to the players. Therefore, we assume 
Ui>U^> ... > uj., i e {A,B} for notational simplicity. 
Given P^, pB and U, if there are m outlets offering lowest price Pmin> the profit generated by 
firm i's j-th outlet is given by 
‘ {s + Ui{l-I){l-S))(p)-c) r>p)>pnnn 
is + Uj{l-I){l-S) + ^){prnin-c) ,r>p)=PrrAn 
0 p) > r 
where s = j j ^ S , and the total profit P ^ , U ) = Z P^, U) 
fc—1 
To conduct backward induction, we first characterize the set of Nash Equilibria of the subgame 
that no firm exits the market, i.e., li>l,ie {A, B}. 
the exact utility function of the sophisticated uninformed consumer. Readers may assume that the consumers are 
indifferent between the two outlets at this moment. As will be discussed in the subsequent section, we focus on the 
set of equilibria which is invariant to the specification of consumers' preference. In these equilibria, if the prices in 
any two outlets are of different distributions, one of them must strictly FSD the other. 
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4 Equilibria of price competition 
We first analyze the firms' behavior for a given distribution of sophisticated uninformed con-
sumers U. Lemmas 1 to 3 are established to direct our focus at a particular subset of the firms' 
strategies when no firm exits the market. 
Lemma 1 In any equilibrium, pj € [pj, r] for i G {A, B} and = 1，2’ …，k, where 
Lemma 1 follows the fact that a firm may offer price r in any outlet and profit the amount of 
(r 一 c)(s + Ul(l - / ) (1 - S)) from the patronage of uninformed consumers. Therefore, any price 
cut must be weighed against the associated loss in revenue from the uninformed consumers. 
Lemma 2 In any equilibrium, it is of zero probability that the lowest prices offered by both firms 
in their outlets are equal. 
The two lemmas jointly indicate that r will never be the minimum price in equilibrium almost 
surely. A loss in revenue from uninformed consumers is inevitable when cutting the price to snatch 
the informed consumers. Therefore, the firms will not have excess number of outlets pricing below 
r. The question remains is whether a firm will find it optimal to offer price discounts in multiple 
outlets. Lemma 2 suggests that when pj^ in happens to be the lowest price Pmin, firm i will be the 
only firm patronized by informed consumers. Thus, the expected number of informed consumers 
shopping from firm i is independent of its number of outlets offering pJ^ jj^ . 
Therefore, when competing for the informed consumers, it is optimal for a firm to offer discount 
solely at one of its outlets, termed "store on sales", and let the rest of the outlets serve the 
uninformed customers onlyi5. Furthermore, a firm will select the "store on sales" among the 
15 Note that the presence of sophisticated uninformed consumers has no bearings on Lemma 3 because their decisions .• 
are regarded as given when a firm sets its price. 
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outlets patronized by the fewest uninformed consumers so that the decline in profit from uninformed 
consumers is minimized. 
Lemma 3 In any equilibrium, every price vector f " in the support of firm i 's strategy must have 
li — 1 coordinates equal to r and the remaining coordinate must lie in the interval [p|., r] • Moreover, 
pi 2 2 …2 p\. must hold for 
Definition 5 The j-th outlet of firm i is said to be the "store on sales “ of firm i ifpj = pj^ in < 
Lemma 3 indicates that the equilibrium strategy of a firm consists of two decisions: the minimum 
price it charges and its choice of "store on sales" When deciding on the "store on sales", a firm 
will exploit any uneven distribution of uninformed consumers across its outlets. Anticipating such 
incentive, sophisticated uninformed consumers will switch between outlets until they are evenly 
distributed over the outlets operated by the same firm. Lemma 4 formalizes this intuition, which 
can also be interpreted as the optimal strategy for the representative sophisticated uninformed 
consumer to conceal his choice of outlet. 
Lemma 4 C/j = Ui, for all j = 1，2，k and i E {A, B}, in any equilibrium. 
Lemma 4 suggests that any equilibrium strategy U can be summarized by UA and UB- AS 
uninformed consumers are uniformly distributed among the outlets of a chain store, the profit 
level of a firm is therefore independent of its decision on "store on sales" given the strategy of the 
sophisticated uninformed consumers. Such degree of symmetry in the firm's choice of "store on 
sales" among outlets leads us to focus on a subset of pricing strategies, in which the firm's choice 
of "store on sales" and its price discount are independent. 
i6lt is possible that Pr(Pmin = r) > 0 for one of the firms in equilibrium. The term "store on sales" becomes 
ambiguous in this case. Therefore, we exclude such case from our formal definition of "store on sales". 
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Definition 6 A pricing strategy is proportional if there eodst (c^，c ’^ ••” ot],) > 0 such that 
I, 
力 aj- = 1 and for any j,k = l，2，..."i，4巧(p) = (P), for all p < r. F'(P') is called 
disproportional if it is not proportional. 
Lemma 5 For any •P(jP) satisfying Lemma 3,厂乂 f " ) is proportional if and only if firm i 's choice 
of "store on sales “ and the price discount it offers are independent. 
The vector (o^ ，o^ ，…，Q;|.) of a proportional strategy represents firm i's assignment of "store on 
sales", in which o j is interpreted as the probability that the j-th outlet will be the "store on sales". 
Lemma 5 states that any equilibrium pricing strategy, if proportional, is completely characterized 
by the assignment of "store on sales" (c4，c^，…’ o : } � a n d the distribution of the price discount 
K M -
Note that a proportional pricing strategy F^(P^) is essentially symmetric among the outlets in 
any equilibrium with Ui > 0. Otherwise, one of the outlets will be strictly preferred by sophisticated 
uninformed consumers to another outlet of the firm. 
In the subsequent analysis, we will restrict our attention to the set of proportional pricing 
strategies, and any pricing strategy we refer to is proportional unless specified otherwise^^. In 
general, there is a vast set of equilibria involving disproportional pricing strategy(ies). However, 
most of them vanish if we specify the Bernoulli utility function for every consumer. On the other 
hand, the set of equilibria consisting of proportional pricing strategies always exists and is invariant 
to a wide class of consumer preference. We postpone the discussion on disproportional pricing 
strategy until the end of this section. 
We now characterize the distribution of the minimum price charged by the firms. We first 
establish the connection between the firms' best responses to a given distribution of sophisticated 
uninformed consumers and the equilibria in the model of sales with unevenly distributed unin-
formed consumers. For any strategy of the sophisticated uninformed consumers U, a game G{U) is 
The assumption of proportional pricing strategy is required for Lemma 7 and Proposition 2. 
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constructed as follows: there are I informed consumers but no sophisticated uninformed consumers. 
Both firms operate a single outlet only, and the outlet of firm i is visited by s + Ui{l — / ) (1 — S) 
naive uninformed consumers. 
Lemma 6 Given the strategy of the uninformed consumers U satisfying Lemma 4，the firms' strate-
gies F乂pi), i e {A,B], are optimal if and only if the support of i G {A,B}, satisfies 
Lemma 3, and {i^min(p)' -^min W) constitutes a Nash Equilibrium ofG{U). 
Narasimhan (1988) characterizes the set of equilibria for the game G{U) and provides the 
following proposition^®: .. 
Proposition 1 (Narasimhan (1988)) Suppose UB > UA, G{U) has a unique equilibrium in 
which and share the same support \p^,r] 
i ^ i > ) = l � + _ / ) ( l - 幻 ( g ) � 
U P ) - s+us(i-m-s)+i^' 1 ( 口 ) 丨 （B) 
for all p e b ^ , r), where - c)I = ( r - ^ ) ( s + Ub{1 一 / ) (1 一 S)), and = = 1. 
Proof . See Narasimhan (1988). • 
Corollary 1 If UB > UA, then i^ minW 办as no mass points, whereas has one at r and 
PSin strictly FSD p么in. Otherwise, FA^(p) = and the c.d.f.s contain no mass points. 
Proof. Through the direct comparison of the distribution functions (a) and (b) • 
18 Narasimhan (1988) studies a duopoly model in which the two firms are patronized by positive but different 
numbers of loyal customers and engage in price competition for the brand switchers. The loyal customers play 
the role of uninformed consumers in our model, whereas brand switchers and informed consumers share the same 
behavior. 
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When uninformed consumers randomize their visits among the outlets with equal probabilities, 
the firms' optimal strategies simply resemble the symmetric equilibrium in Varian (1980). However, 
when more uninformed consumers, even by a slight amount, patronize the outlets of firm B than 
those of firm A, firm B faces a steeper trade-off between the profit from uninformed consumers 
and informed consumers than firm A. As a result, firm B is less inclined to cut its price and enjoy 
a guaranteed profit level (r — c)(s + (7B(1 — / ) (1 — S) by offering price r. Anticipating its rival's 
unwillingness to make price cut, firm A also moderates its price discount and may secure the profit 
level ( ^ - c ) ( / + s + UA{1 - / ) ( 1 - S) if it offers price 
Narasimhan (1988) shows that the guaranteed profit levels result in equilibrium, and the unique 
equilibrium requires the two firms to randomize their prices between ^ and r. and i^ min(p) 
for p e r) can be solved using the fact that every point in the support of a mixed strategy 
yields identical payoffs. That is, for all p € 
(R - c ) ( s + UB(1 - I ) ( 1 - S)) 二 B - C)[S + UB(1 - / ) ( 1 - 5 ) + (1 - F 丄 剛 
(^-C)(J + S + UA(1- I)(1 - 5 ) ) = (p-c)[s-H UA(1 - I ) ( 1 - S ) + (1-
We now discuss the equilibrium distribution of sophisticated uninformed consumers. Consider 
a subgame with firm A operating more outlets than firm B. Suppose that, initially, all uninformed 
consumers are uniformly distributed among the outlets, as in Varian(1980), so that the two firms 
share the same distribution of As sophisticated uninformed consumers recognize the firms' 
incentive to offer price discount in at most one outlet, they will switch to the outlets of firm B to 
improve their chance to patronize the "store on sales" of the firm. Therefore, the firm operating 
fewer outlets always has an advantage in competing for these consumers. At the same time, this 
also creates an edge for firm A to offer discount and compete for informed consumers because it 
now faces a smaller decline in the revenue from uninformed consumers and has more outlets to hide 
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its "store on sales" from sophisticated uninformed consumers. This interaction between the firms 
and sophisticated uninformed consumers gives rise to Lemma 7. 
Lemma 7 If k > Ij i, then Uj > Ui and Pr{ pj^ j^  < t ^ in equilibrium. 
For notational brevity, we assume IA > IB in the subsequent analysis. Following Lemma 7， 
consideration of the cases UB > UA > ^ and ^ = UB > UA = 0 suffice. The primary difference 
between the two cases under consideration lies in the degree of flexibility in firm A's assignment of 
"store on sales" which leads to the multiplicity of equilibria in which C/>i = 0 in Proposition 2. 
Definition 7 An equilibrium of stage 2 is Non-degenerate if Ui> 0, i e {A,B}; otherwise, it is 
Degenerate. 
Proposition 2 If (Ia — Ib){I + j^^S) < (1 — /)(1 — 5), stage 2 has a unique Non-degenerate 
equilibrium. In this unique equilibrium, the distribution of sophisticated uninformed consumers is 
given by 
and the marginal distribution ofpj is the same across the outlets. Otherwise, the set of equilibria in 
stage 2 is a continuum of Degenerate equilibria in which [/义=0 and UB — The profit levels of 
the firms are the same in every Degenerate equilibrium. The multiplicity of equilibria arises entirely 
from firm A，s assignment of "store on sale ", where 
- + J ^ S ) > ( 1 - / ) ( ! - S) 
The c.d.f. of the prices in the outlets in the unique Non-degenerate equilibrium is 
FfiP) = F^iP) = + IB) + 1 - I - W A — h) + (1 — . 
17 
where 
and Ff{r) = F^{r) = 1. 
The expected profit levels of the unique Non-degenerate equilibrium are given by 
{N^, UB} = C)[IILA — IB) + ( L - / ) ] , I ( R - C)[I{IB - + 1 - / + 2(1 - ^ ) / ] } 
The equilibrium profits yielded by the continuum of Degenerate equilibria are given by 
{lU，n^} = { (r — c){slA + + 丄 ; ? 1 ( 1 — ( r - c)(( l - / ) ( l - 5 ) + SIB)} 
Corollary 2 If I A >IB> 1, then in any equilibrium, IAUA < IBUB and 11/1+lis > ( r - c ) ( l - / ) . 
Equality holds if and on if IA = IB. 
Proof . Through the direct comparison of the associated values of the variables in Non-degenerate 
equilibrium and Degenerate equilibrium • 
The first part of Corollary 2 indicates that the firm with more outlets not only suffers fewer 
visits of uninformed consumers per outlet but also has a smaller overall share of sophisticated 
uninformed consumers. 
In Varian (1980) and Baye et al. (1992), the price competition for informed consumers com-
pletely dissipates any surplus over the profit level that a firm may earn from the purchase of 
uninformed consumers at monopoly price. The second part of Corollary 2 states that the firms will 
indeed enjoy higher profit in the presence of informed consumers if they operate different numbers 
of outlets. The reason is that the consumers form their belief about the prices based on the number 
of outlets operated by the firms. When the two firms operate different numbers of outlets, the 
consumers will differentiate between the outlets of different chain stores. As a result, the price 
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competition between firms becomes less intense. 
The underlying arguments of Lemma 7 and Proposition 2 require the assignment of "store on 
sales" and the price discount to be independent in both firms. A much larger set of equilibria will 
arise when the correlation between these two decisions is introduced to influence the sophisticated 
uninformed consumers' decision. Such possibility is illustrated in the example in Appendix A.l. 
We restrict our attention to the set of proportional pricing strategies to achieve generality 
with regard to consumer preference. When deducing the above results, we only assume that all 
sophisticated uninformed consumers' Bernoulli utility functions are strictly decreasing in price. 
Therefore, our results are valid for a very general class of preference, which can be heterogeneous 
among consumers. 
On the flip side, the strict FSD criterion also allows a vast set of equilibria involving dispro-
portional pricing strategy. If we replace the strict FSD criterion by a complete specification of 
the Bernoulli utility function for every sophisticated uninformed consumer, the set of equilibria 
involving disproportional pricing strategy will be tremendously smaller, and which equilibrium will 
remain depends on the utility function specification. In contrast, the set of the equilibria consisting 
of proportional pricing strategies is independent of the exact form of the Bernoulli utility functions. 
The reason is that if pricing strategies are proportional, the prices in two different outlets must 
share the same marginal distribution if neither one of them strictly FSD the other. In other words, 
the set of equilibria we characterized requires minimum assumption on consumer preference. 
One may also wonder whether a smaller set of equilibria can be obtained if we impose additional 
assumptions on the consumers' risk preference. If we strengthen our assumption on the risk prefer-
ence for the sophisticated uninformed consumers to risk-neutral, i.e., they only patronize from the 
outlets with the lowest expected price, or strictly risk-averse, i.e., they will never purchase from 
an outlet which price strictly Second-order Stochastic Dominates that of another outlet, it can be 
shown that the arguments behind Lemmas 1 to 7 and Proposition 2 remain valid using the fact that 
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strict First-order Stochastic Dominance implies a higher mean and strict Second-order Stochastic 
D o m i n a n c e i 9 . Therefore, our results are robust to the assumption on the risk preference of the 
consumers. 
In the next section, we show that there exist subgarae perfect equilibria, in which firms operate 
multiple outlets; hence, price coordination arises in equilibrium. 
5 Equilibrium number of outlets 
We now analyze the firms' decision on the number of outlets. For simplicity, we only consider 
pure strategies in stage 1. When there is only one firm in the market, we assume no entry deterrence 
and the firm will simply charge the reservation price r earning monopoly profit r-c-Kk. 
Firm i's profit function Ili{li, Ij) is given by 
‘ 0 li = 0 
(r-c)- Kli li>0’lj = 0 
^(r - c)ll(lj 一 li)(l I]-Kli li> Ij > 0, (li - lj)D(li + y < 1 - 5 
‘ ( r - c ) ( j ^ ( l - I)S + - Kk ,li>lj>0,{li-lj)D{k + lj)>l-S 
i ( r - c)il{lj -li) + l - I ) - Kli Ij > /t > 0, (Ij - li)D{lj + li)<l-S 
(1 - I){r - c ) ( l - j^S) 一 Kk Ij >li>0, {Ij - li)D{lj + li)>l-S 
where i + j and D{li + = + for k + Ij > l ? � . 
Let h denote ^ > 0，i.e., the ratio of the outlet operating cost to the highest possible profit 
generated from the consumers. As manifested in Lemma 8，we assume that h < - I) in our 
analysis to obtain non-trivial results. 
rv rv 
^^XF is said to be Strictly Second-order Stochastic Dominates Xc if / F{x)dx < / G{x)dx for all y and strict 
J —CO J —oo 
equality holds for some y 
20 We denote the profit function by lli{li,lj), where the first argument represents the number of outlets of firm i, 
unless specified otherwise. If i is specified as A or B, the order of the arguments always follows {IA,IB). .. 
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Lemma 8 If h < 5(1 — I), then no firms will exit the market in equilibrium. 
Characterizing the set of equilibria for the general case involves complicated algebra. Pure 
strategy Equilibria may not even exist for arbitrary values of S, I and h. An example is given in 
Appendix A.2 
We focus on the settings 5 and — 0+ because they serve as the extended version of 
Varian (1980) and Baye et al. (1992), respectively. The introduction of the uninformed consumers' 
choice in Baye et al. (1992) is essentially a refinement of the model in Varian (1980) as it makes 
the symmetric strategy profile the unique equilibrium. However, this is not the case for — 0+ 
and 1~ as we will see that the sets of equilibria in these two settings are generally non-
intersecting^ ^  The primary reason is that in our model, the firms' number of outlets provides 
uninformed consumers information content that is absent in Baye et al. (1992). 
Let G{S) denote the stage 1 game with payoff functions Ui{li,lj]S)^i G {A,B}. When 5„ -> 
S', Giim{S') denote the game with payoff functions lim , Ili{li, Ij； Sn), i G {A, B}. 
Lemma 9 For S' e {0,1}，let { 5 „ } be a sequence with limit S' and Sn € (0，1) for all n. Every pure 
strategy equilibrium of G{Sn) converges to a pure strategy equilibrium of Giim(<5') when Sn —> S'. 
Moreover, if every pure strategy equilibrium of G\im{S') is strict, then the set of pure strategy 
equilibria of G{Sn) converges to the set of pure strategy equilibria of G\im{S'). 
When studying the cases S 0+ and S —> we will first take the limit of the profit functions 
and directly analyze the set of pure strategy equilibria of the associated game^ .^ As we will show 
that all pure strategy equilibria of G]im{S') are generically strict, Lemma 9 indicates that the set of 
pure strategy equilibria of Giim{S') is the limit of the set of pure strategy equilibria in the nearby 
This is true even if we change the settings to 5 = 0 and 5 = 1. 
In an earlier version of this thesis, it was mistaken that the set of pure strategy equilibria of G{SN) always 
converges to the set of pure strategy equilibria of Gum(5') when SN —» S'. The author is indebted to Prof. Li Duozhe 
for pointing out this error and suggesting Lemma 9 to fill the loophole. 
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stage 1 game when 5 -> 5' This approach provides us more insights into the optimal number 
of outlets by inspecting of the limit of profit functions. 
5.1 Equilibrium number of outlets when almost all consumers are naive 
In the case where almost all consumers are naive, the price distribution in the outlets no longer 
acts as a strategic variable in the competition for uninformed consumers. A unique Non-degenerate 
equilibrium arises in stage 2 if and only if the firms operate an equal number of outlets. Otherwise, 
it results in a continuum of Degenerate equilibria. 
The profit function for firm i (J ^ i) for 5 is given by 
’ 0 li = 0 
Ui{li,lj) = r-c-Kli ,li > 1,/j = 0 
{ r - c ) { l - I ) j ^ - K k li>ljj>l 
Notice that when no firms exit the market, the price competition for the informed consumers 
in stage 2 is fierce to the degree that it drives down the firms' profit to their lowest guaranteed 
level as in the Betrand model. As a result, the primary motive behind the firms' decision k > 0 
in this case is to compete for the share of uninformed consumers. Apart from the case that one 
of the firms exits the market, the firms' choice of k indeed resembles the discrete output Cournot 
competition with inverse demand function P{q) = |(1 — I) and constant production cost h. 
Proposition 3 When S generically, the game has an unique and symmetric equilibrium 
such that IA = IB = where 
I [呆1 呆 ^ [ 站 + I 
z= < ， 
[[销+ 1 Otherwise 
23 This does not apply to the equilibria of stage 2 in the path of play. ., 
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and [x] denote the greatest integer smaller than x. 
Note that z > 2 whenever h < - I). Hence, there exists equilibria in which the firms 
open multiple outlets. Furthermore, there is a subtle difference in the set of equilibria in the cases 
5 -> 1 - and S = The stage 1 outcome in the two settings always coincide. However, when all 
the uninformed consumers are naive, the firms' assignments of "store on sales" are irrelevant for the 
consumers' decision in stage 2 and there are no restrictions on the choice of "store on sales". The 
presence of an arbitrarily small number of sophisticated uninformed consumers will diminish the 
multiplicity of equilibria in these subgames, and the firms must randomize their "store on sales" 
with equal probability among their outlets in the equilibrium outcome for the case of 5 —^  
5.2 Equilibrium number of outlets when almost all consumers are sophisticated 
The profit function of firm i for 5 —> 0+ is given by 
0 li 二 0 
(r-c)- Kli li>0’lj = 0 
i ( r — c)[I{lj 一 li){l -^) + l-I]-Kli lj + i-l>li>lj>0 
四(仏 Ij) — < (r- c)I(jjj^) - Kli A + Ij > 0 
\ [ T - c ) { I { l j - l i ) ^ \ - I ) - K k l j > l i > l j - 7 + l,li>0 
(r 一 c ) ( l - J) - Kli l j - ^ + l>li>0 
< 
In the setting when almost all consumers are sophisticated, the outlets solely play the role of 
the vehicles for price coordination. We now show that the optimal price coordination in this case 
involves two outlets at most^®. This occurs when the portion of informed consumers exceeds that 
of the uninformed by •j^，and is interpreted as the ratio of the outlet operating cost to the 
For the setting 5 = 1, Lemma 4 and Proposition 2 become irrelevant. The rest of the results in section 4 remain 
valid if one drops the statements concerning U, 
25It is easy to verify that any Ji > 3 is not rationalizable when S is sufficiently close to 0. 
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guaranteed profit from the patronage of uninformed consumers. 
Proposition 4 When S -> 0+，if (1 - 1 ) { I - 5) < h , then the unique suhgame perfect equilibrium 
requires both firms to operate a single outlet. In the case of (1 — /)(/ 一去）> h, one firm operates 
exactly two outlets while the other firm operates one outlet only in equilibrium. 
Unlike in Baye et al. (1992), which shows that the unique equilibrium in the model of sales 
is symmetric, Proposition 4 indicates the existence of equilibria, in which the firms engage in 
asymmetric behaviors after introducing chain stores into a duopoly version of the model of sales^ ®. 
In the path of play of this equilibrium, the firm operating two outlets offers discount price p^ 
in exactly one outlet. The two outlets are assigned to be the "store on sales" in stage 2 with 
probability A E [1 - 1,1] and 1 - A, respectively. The other firm with a single outlet will offer 
discount price pi with probability I > ^ and set the price at r with probability 1 —/. The discount 
prices p^ and pi in the two firms share the same distribution with c.d.f. H(p) = 1 —(甲 ) (器）and 
support [/c + (1—I)r, r] • Moreover, the firm with two outlets has 1 —probabi l i ty to be patronized 
by the informed consumers. The firm operating a single outlet enjoys a profit (r — c)(l — I) — K 
while the other firm earns the amount I{r — c)(l — I) — 2K. 
Note that the previous results will not hold if we replace the assumption — 0+ by = 0. To 
see this, consider the following symmetric strategy profile. 
Suppose each firm has three outlets indexed by {1,2,3}. The pricing strategy of each firm is 
given by p\ = r, Pr(p2 = c and p各=r + c) = r + c and pg = c) = i € {A,B} such that 
no pj strictly FSD another. These pricing strategies are proportional, and (c4，c4，c4) = (0’ 5). 
The sophisticated uninformed consumers are distributed evenly in the first outlet of the two firms, 
i.e., Uf^  = C/f = i . 
This strategy profile is an equilibrium of stage 2 but of a different form from those in Propo-
Apart from the pure strategy equilibria, a unique mixed strategy equilibrium exists when (1 — / ) ( / — > h. It 
is symmetric and involves randomizing between U =1 and 2. .• 
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4' 
sition 2. In fact, the presence of naive uninformed consumers effectively rules out the otherwise 
weakly dominated strategies in stage 2 from our consideration^^. Without them, a chain store may 
randomize its "store of sales" among a subset of its outlets and charge an arbitrarily high price 
in the remaining outlets in that subset. This pricing tactic will deter uninformed consumers from 
seeking the discount offer and segment the competition for two groups of consumers. As a result, 
the uninformed consumers will be offered the monopoly price, and the firms will engage in Betrand 
competition for informed consumers. 
To address the issue in the case of S = 0, one may simply restrict the price space to [0,r], as 
the firms have a strict incentive to reset the price if a sophisticated uninformed consumer visits an 
outlet initially offering price above r. Moreover, consumers may take this into consideration when 
forming their belief on the price distributions. Alternatively, we may assume that a sophisticated 
uninformed consumer select an outlet according to the strict FSD criterion on consumer surplus, 
defined as Max{r-p^j, 0). Under these two settings, the described tactic is no longer applicable, and 
Lemma 2, Lemma 4 as well as Lemma 6 remain valid. If we further assume independence between 
"store on sales" and the minimum price of a firm, then Lemma 7 and Proposition 2 will also hold. 
However, the set of Degenerate equilibria will be far larger than that permitted in Proposition 2， 
as P^ need not satisfy Lemma 3. As the firms' payoffs are left unchanged, so is Proposition 4. 
The substitution for 5 = 0 using S — 0+ can also be understood as a "trembling hand" refine-
ment such that there is an arbitrarily small probability that an uninformed consumer "trembles" 
and visits the outlets with C/j = Therefore, we decide to retain the assumption 5 > 0 in our 
study for simplicity . 
27 In contrast to Lemmas 1 and 3, in the case of s = 0, it is optimal for the firms to offer any ri>cm ALL the 
outlets with {/j 二 0 as long as the pair of c.di.s {Fmin(p)>^min(p)} satisfies (a) and (b). 
28In fact, the assumption — 0+ is unnecessarily stronger than the needed "trembling hand" refinement because 
uninform probability over all the outlets upon "trembling" is not required for our results. 
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6 Incentive for Obfuscation 
The previous section demonstrates that uninformed consumers' knowledge about the price dis-
tribution is pivotal to the determination of equilibrium outcome. We may endogenize the infor-
mation structure by introducing a prior stage in which the firms decides whether to engage in 
obfuscation distorting the consumer knowledge. If obfuscation occurs, almost all the sophisticated 
uninformed consumers will be eliminated {S — 1~). Otherwise, almost all the uninformed con-
sumers are sophisticated (5 —» 0+). 
The occurrence of obfuscation can be a result of a joint decision, i.e., it requires action from 
both firms or a unilateral action, i.e., it results whenever one of the firms chooses to obfuscate. We 
find that such distinction does not affect the equilibrium outcome because obfuscation of this kind 
is strictly detrimental to the firms' profit level. 
Proposition 5 Assuming that h < ^(1 — /) and obfuscation costs the firm e�0，obfuscation 
will never arise in equilibrium regardless of the magnitude of e and I, and obfuscation results from 
unilateral or joint decision. 
Proposition 5 suggests that the consumer knowledge about the price distributions of the outlets 
improves the profit level of the duopoly^®. The rise in profit comes from two sources: efficiency 
gain and moderation of price competition. With obfuscation, the firms compete for a larger share 
of uninformed consumers by operating more outlets. As outlets generate no economic values, 
inefficiency results when the firms operate more than a single outlet. Second, the consumers' 
knowledge about the price distributions allows the potential differentiation between the firms, as a 
firm can create an edge in competing for informed consumers by operating multiple outlets. 
29The assumption that obfuscation is costly i.e., e > 0 is essential for Proposition 5. If it is the opposite case in 
which the firms may incur a cost 5 > 0 to inform the consumers, then a similar conclusion will hold when h < 一/) 




We study the price competition between chain stores in a duopoly model based on the frame-
works in Varian (1980) and Baye et al. (1992). We characterize the condition in which a firm 
operates multiple outlets and sets different prices in equilibrium. The optimal price coordination is 
to provide discount in one outlet and offer monopoly price in the rest. In this case, the uninformed 
consumers will differentiate between the outlets of the two firms. This form of equilibrium differs 
from those in Varian (1980) and Baye et al. (1992). We also differentiate and study two potential 
obfuscation behaviors. The conditions for the firms to engage in each type of obfuscation are char-
acterized. We find that a firm may operate additional outlets to conceal its discount offer from the 
uninformed consumers. On the contrary, obfuscations undermining consumer knowledge about the 
price distributions in outlets will never occur in equilibrium. 
Although the model studied here is highly stylized, the idea of price coordination is of economic 
interest and empirical relevance given the widespread presence of chain stores in reality. While 
the existing models on price dispersion assume each firm sets one price only, our finding illustrates 
that the price distribution may change substantially if the prices are allowed to vary across the 
outlets. Our study also contributes to the obfuscation literature by explicitly modeling outlets 




A . l An Example of Equilibrium with a Disproportional Pricing Strategy 
Consider a subgame with S 二 ^ ， I 二 ^ and both firms operating two outlets. Lemma 7 
dictates that UA = VB and Pr( < p ^ J = | in any equilibrium. This conclusion is further 
strengthened by Proposition 2’ which indicates that the price distribution of pj is the same in every 
outlet. We now postulate an equilibrium in which UA = 0 and UB = and check if the strategy 
of each party is optimal. According to Proposition 1，any and F丑(P丑)are optimal if 
F^ip') = IF^M 
for all p' e lp , r ) , where p = f r + |c, and F^^Jr) = F ^ J r ) = 1. 
For simplicity, we assume F^(F^) is proportional such that 
= I ( 却 ] , M and,- = 1,2 
The pricing strategy for firm A is as follows: pj^ in is drawn according to F^^^(p). If pj^ in < P = 
\r + ^c, then the first outlet will be the "store on sales". Otherwise, the second outlet will offer 
the discount price. F i { p ) and F^ijp) are given by 
Flip) = I , 
1 p = r 
From the definition of Fj{p), it is easy to see that 
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Fi^(p) = • i f (P) > Ffip) > F^{p) = 0’ for all p E (p,p) 
lim = 5 > lim Ff(p) = i > lim F � ) = \ 
Therefore, no outlets offers a price strictly FSD that of another outlet. U is & best response to the 
firms' strategies. To conclude, we have constructed an equilibrium not covered by Lemma 7 and 
Proposition 2. 
In general, a set of equilibria with a specific U may be derived in the following manner: First, 
pin down the associated FA^b) and with Proposition 1. Second, construct a set of Fj(p) 
li 
in which no p) strictly FSD another using the fact that F丄in(P') = ^^jiP') for all p' < r stated 
i = i 
in the proof of Lemma 5. 
A.2 An Example in which a Pure Strategy Equilibrium does not exist for Stage 1 
Consider the setting i" = | ， = | and /i = the profit function can be normalized as 
0 li = 0 
1 - ^li k > 0’ Ij = 0 
mJ - - 若 ) + i] — 缺 h > h > 0, {k - lj){l + liiij) < 1 
【•?•十上十 
UWj - h) + § ) - 轴 Ij >ii>o, {Ij - m 
‘ § ( 1 - 5 1 7 ^ ) - hli h >h>0, {Ij 一 li){l + I ^ ) 2 1 
As h = < ^(1 — I), no firms will exit the market in equilibrium. We suppose that there exist 
a pure strategy equilibrium {IA,IB) where IA > H > 0. Notice that {IA 一 + < 1 can 
be simplified as l\ < {IB +1)^ 一 1. Together with the assumption IA > IB, {IA -�B)(l + TXH^) < 1 
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holds if and only if Ia = h-
Consider the possibility that =IB = N > 1. It is profitable for a firm to reduce its number 
of outlets as 
… 1 � 2 , 1 1 n � 1 1 1 , 1 1 1 tt / � 
n s ( n , l ) = 3 ( l _ - m ) _ - = - _ - + ^ ^ > 3 — - n = nB(n，n) 
Therefore, the only possible symmetric equilibrium is (1,1). It remains to check the deviation 
Ia>2. 
咖 南 - 如 • 
Numerically, lU(“，1) is maximized at iyi = 5 and 11^(5,1) > rU(l，1). We conclude that there 
are no symmetric equilibria and turn our attention to asymmetric equilibria, where ^ ― 1 > > 0-
Suppose IB > 2. 
Thus, we only have to consider IB = 1. The best response of firm A in this case is IA = 5. The 
payoff function of firm B is then given by 
楊 ) 令 
Numerically, is maximized at IB = 4, such that 115(5’4) > 1X5(5,1). Therefore, no 
pure strategy equilibria exist under the specified setting. 
Nevertheless, any pure strategy li> N is strictly dominated hyli — O where N is an integer such 
that r—c < kN. Therefore, the stage 1 game may be viewed as a finite game with k — 0,1, ...,iV—1, 
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i e {A,B} in which a mixed strategy equilibrium always exists. 
A.3 Formal Proofs 
A.3.1 Lemma 1 
Proof . As firm i may set m = r to ensure that l 4 ( p A ， > (r - c)(s + 17^ (1 - / ) (1 - 5)) 
for every outlet, pj must not exceed r; otherwise, zero profit will be generated. The lower bound 
on pj is which the highest possible profit for the firm equal to the guaranteed level 
li 
{s + C/](l - / ) (1 -S) + I) ( ^ - c ) + ( r - c ) Y ^ { s + U i { l - I ) { l - S ) ) = ( r - c ) 
— k=l 
• 
A.3.2 Lemma 2 
Proof . Suppose it is of positive probability that firms A and B offer the lowest price at the m-th 
and n-th outlet, respectively, i.e., p么=p^ = p' = pmin-
If p' > then there exists e > 0 such that a deviant firm will be better off by 
allocating the probability assigned to p' to some slightly lower price p' — e. The existence of such 
profitable deviation stems from the fact that the set of p assigned with positive probability by the 
opponent j must be countable. Thus, there always exist some p' — e which is chosen as p j with 
zero probability. 
Suppose p' = = p么.Firm A will find it profitable to allocate the probability 
assigned to p' to r. Similarly for p' = = p^. • 
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A.3.3 Lemma 3 
Proof . Let P�=(转，转，...’转‘）be a price vector in the support of Suppose there exists m 
and n such that r > ^ > ^ = 
If r > ^ > then no informed consumers will shop in the m-th outlet, and lit increases if 
firm i deviates and sets p!^ = r. 
The remaining case is r > ^ = ^ = ^ jn - Offering p^^ < r in multiple outlets generates value 
only when p^^^ = so that the firms compete for a greater share of informed consumers with 
their number of outlets offering pmin- However, Lemma 2 shows that such event is of probability 
zero. Therefore, any P^ =(药，转，...，转‘)with at least two prices below r must be inferior to 
= (r, 
Assume Ul > U} for some s and t. If ^ = < r, then firm i can increase Hj by setting 
PI = r and pj = 見 < r. Therefore, the notational assumption C/f 2 2 … 2 Uf. implies that 
转 > ^ > ... > j^ i.. The interval of the remaining coordinate is then derived from Lemma 1. • 
A.3.4 Lemma 4 
Proof . If li = 1, the result is trivial. We then consider the case k > 2. 
Suppose not. There must exist n > 1 such that 0 < Uf. = UJ;‘一丄=...=一< 
Mm([/|, U^,..., for firm i 
Notice that U] > 0. For j = 1 , 2 , 一 n, any price vector P* in the support of must 
satisfy 转 = 耗 = … = = r. Moreover, the equilibrium strategy of firm i cannot be a pure 
strategy p\ = = ... = p], = r, otherwise the best response of its rival firm is not well-defined. 
Thus, it must be of positive probability that firm i sets p^j^ < r and selects the "store on sale" 
among the last n outlets, say, the last one, such that Pr(pJ. < r) > 0. Moreover, Lemma 1 implies 
that Fi. (r) = 1. In this case, p\ strictly FSD p],，which contradicts the optimality of uninformed 
consumers' decision. • .‘ 
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A.3.3 Lemma 3 
h 
Proof . We first prove that F^^^ip') = for all p' < r. 
j = i 
Lemma 3 implies Pr(r > ？ 4 i n > V' and pj < r) = Pr(r > p} > j/ ) =Pr(r > pp 一 FJ(p') and 
k 
Pr(r > J = Z ) > pj). For < r , i G {A, B}, 
i = i 
= > pjnin) = 1 - Pr(r = pU) 一 Pr(r > > p') 
h 
= 1 - Pr(r = ？4in) - E > > P' and p) < r) 
li h 
= E W ) + [1 - = Pjnin) — Pr(r > PLJI = E 巧(力 
j = i . J=i • 
Suppose F^(P^) is proportional. There exists {a\,ai...a\.) > 0 such that for any j, k = 1,2,...’ k 
， = aiFl{p), for all p < r. As 力 a) = 1，we may assume a\ > 0. Hence, Fj(p) = ^ F f ( p ) 
for p < r and j — 2，..., k 
h i 
Using the above result, for any p < r, i^^JP) = Y1 杂 巧 ⑷ = 杀 巧 � . T h e r e f o r e , = 
3=1 1 1 
^ / i i p ) = = 1,2, ...，k. Notice that 
l i m F j b ) 
P r ( 和 f4in < H Plnin < 0 = [ = 
r— 
a j is the probability that the j-th outlet is the "store on sales" of firm i. For any j such that a j > 0， 
Pr(巧_ p i 丄 〒 - _ - F丄 in � 
Pr(pj < p ' < r \ p j < r ) denotes the distribution of price discount in j-th outlet. As it is the same 
across any outlet with oij > 0, the choice of "store on sales" and the price discount are independent. 
This proves the "only if" part of the second statement. We now proceed to the "if" part. 
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Assume the independence between the choice of "store on sales" and the price discount it offers 
for some Let a j denote the probability that firm i selects the j-th outlet as the "store on 
IA . I 
s a l e s " s u c h t h a t X ) = 1 - T h e n , f o r p ' < r 
j=i 
= P r ( p ； = pjnin < r - b U < r) Pr(pLin < P') = ^^nip') 
Therefore, aiTi{p') = for <r and any j，fc = 1 ， 2 ’ k . Thus, ？ i s proportional. 
• 
A.3.6 Lemma 6 
Proof . We prove the lemma by showing the equivalence between the optimization problems of the 
firms given U and those faced by the two firms in game G{U). 
Let p^ denote the price offered by firm i in its only outlet in game G{U). Notice that Lemma 
2 applies to game G{U) because its proof requires no restrictions on U. Thus, p^ = p^ will not 
occur for almost sure and the expected number of informed consumers shopping at firm i is simply 
Let ikP denote firm i's strategy. For i G {A, B}, firm i's optimization problem in game G{U) 
is given by Max / ！ ！ 办 * ， w h e r e 
R+ 
fi 办 ， M ) ) = (s + U i { l - / ) ( l - 5 ) + ( l - M ^ { p ) ) l ) {p - c ) 
and is any c.d.f. with support R+. 
We now work out the firms，optimization problems in the subgame for a given U. 
Lemma 3 implies that if pJj^ jj^  < r，firm i will offer pJ^ j^  in the "store on sales" only and 
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price at r in the rest. As U is fixed and satisfies Lemma 4，the choice of "store on sales" is 
irrelevant to the firms' profit. We assume that the last outlet is always the "store on sales", i.e., 
PLin 二 for simplicity. As a result, any firm i's optimal strategy F 炉 ) c a n be expressed as 
p^ i = p i ? = … = P i i - i = T and pi. is distributed according to some c.d.f.丑乂p). As p], and pj^  never 
tie and the informed consumers make their purchase at the k-th. store of the firms for almost sure, 
the profit function for firm i is given by = = 
+ 一 /)(1 - 5 ) + ( l - H ^ { p i ) ) l ) {p-c) + {k - l){s + Ui{l - m - S)){r 一 c) 
For i e { A , B } , firm i's optimization problem is then Max J l i i { p , H ^ ) d W { p ) , and H^{p) is a 
_ R+ 
c.d.f. with support R+. Observe that {k - l ) (s + - J)(l - S)){r - c) is independent of 
and the optimization problems of the two firms are equivalent to those in game G{U). 
Result follows. • 
A.3.7 Lemma 7 
Proof . Suppose IB > IA but UB > VA- AS UB > 0, firm B must assign each outlet probability 
to be the "store on sales" so that the price in none of its outlets strictly FSD that of another outlet 
of firm B, Therefore, Ff{p) = | 击气！^^) ’ g 二 ； ’ j = 1，2，…，h 
For firm A, we simply assume a f = Marc(a么a� ’ ...，a^ ) such that > > As Corollary 
1 implies that pgj , strictly FSD = > ^F^^M = FfiP') for all p' < r 
and Ff(r) = F^{r) = 1. The fact that p f strictly FSD pf^ contradicts the assumption Uf- < Uf. 
The first half of the statement is proved. 
The first half of the statement, again with Corollary 1，implies that p j^j^  FSD pJ^ jj^ if k > Ij. 
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Hence, 
Pr{pLn < pLJ = / PripLn < PLJPL = P')dFLn(p') 
Jdp 
= f FUp')dFL{p') > f FLWFLip') = I 
J^p JQp ^ 
This proves the second part of the statement. • 
A.3.8 Proposition 2 
Proof . We first show that at most one Non-degenerate equilibrium exists and characterize its 
necessary and sufficient condition. 
Suppose UB > U A > 0. Then, the firms must assign each of their outlets equal probability to 
be the "store on sales" so that no outlets are strictly preferred by the uninformed consumers to 
other outlets of the same firm. As an equilibrium, and must satisfy the specified 
form in (a) and (b). The c.d.f.s of and p f for j = 1，2，...’ IA and fe = 1，2，IB are then given by 
条 》 s + I 7 ” ( l - 〜 一 口 ) 丨 
1 S + UA{1-I){1-S) + I S + U B { L - m - S ) T-C 
for all where - c)I = ( r - p ^ ) ( s + UB{1 - / ) ( 1 - S)) and i f (r) = Ff{r) = 1 
Notice that — Fjf (p) can be written as Ci + ^ for p G r) and equal to zero at 
p = p^ and p = r. In equilibrium, neither pf strictly FSD p登 nor the other way round. This is 
true if and only if Ci = C2 = 0. Hence, the marginal distributions of pj are identical in all outlets. 
The condition Ci = C2 = 0 can be rewritten as 
IB{S + UB(1- M - S ) + I) = IA{S + UA(1 - /)(1 - S ) +1) . 
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Together with IAUA + IBUB = 1’ we have 
‘ i ^ ^ ^ S r ^ + i ? 叫 一 n c H " 
This strategy profile, if it exists, is an equilibrium as implied by its construction. The existence 
condition {IA - IB){I + < (1 - / ) (1 - S) is derived from the restriction that UA > 0. 
We now characterize the set of Degenerate equilibria and its existence condition. 
Let a f denote the probability that firm A selects its j-th outlet to be the "store on sales". If 
TJA = ^ and UB = the c.d.f.s of p f and p f for j = 1，2，IA and fc = 1，2，...，IB are given by 
奶。) —- 二二“+ ,丨 1 + - 日 ) 1 
for all pe\p^,r), where - c)I = {r-p^){s + UB{1 - / ) ( 1 - S)) and F^{r) = F / ( r ) = 1. 
W.L.O.G., we assume that o;^ > a^, for j = 2’ ...,1A- The strategy profile is an equilibrium if 
and only if p f does not strictly FSD pf. Again, F^{p) - can be written as Ci + ^ for 
p e r) and is equal to zero at p and p = r. Thus, the required condition is C2 > 0, which 
leads to / + s > a f [(I + S)IB + (1 - / ) (1 - S)]. As AF > j j , the necessary condition of existence 
is given by {Ia 一 Ib){I + J+fg — (1 一 "0(1 — S). Again, the construction of this strategy profile 
implies that it is an equilibrium if it exists. Therefore, the necessary condition is also the sufficient 
condition. 
The multiplicity of Degenerate equilibria steins from the assignment of "store on sales". All 
equilibria provide identical payoff profile because the only difference is firm A's choice of outlets 
for offering price discount. 
As the existence conditions of the two types of equilibria are exclusive, it immediately follows 
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that if one type of equilibria exists, it must constitute the full set of equilibria. • 
A.3.9 Lemma 8 
Proof . Suppose there exists an Nash Equilibrium in which IA = 0, firm B will then set IB = l i n 
which ns(0，IB) is mEocimized. In this case, E ^ l , 1) = |(r - c)(l - / ) - K > 0 = UA{0, 1), which 
contradicts the optimality of firm A's decision. • 
A.3.10 Lemma 9 
Proof . First, it is easy to verify that the profit function I[i{lA,lB]S) is piecewise-continuous in 
S. Let L{li,lj]S) = (li - lj)D{li,lj]S) - (1 - S), which is increasing in S. For every pair of 
(IA,IB) in which U + H > 1, if there exist S such that L{li,lj\S) = 0，it can be shown that 
lim Ui{lA,lB]S) = Ili{lA,lB]S). Therefore, Ui{lA,lB',S) is continuous in 5 for i € {A,B}. 
s^s-
Let {5n} be a sequence such that Sn 1— and Sn € (0,1). 
We first show that for any sequence {(1%IB)} such that (1% IQ) is a pure strategy Nash Equi-
librium of G{Sn) for every n, if {IaJb)^ then {IaJb) is a pure strategy N.E. of Giim(l). 
Suppose not. There exists k such that lims-^i-Tli{li,lj] S) > Ij] S), then the 
continuity of 'n.i{lA,lB', S) implies that Ili{li,lj] Sn) > Ili{li,lj] Sn) for some large n. Since { I^ Ib ) 
takes integral values only, ( /J, /J) = (IAJB) when n is large enough. Hence, there exists some n such 
that Ui{li, I'j] Sn) > ni(Z『，I'j] Sn), contradicting the assumption that is a Nash Equilibrium 
of G{Sn)' This proves that the limit of the set of pure strategy equilibria of G{Sn) is a subset of 
the pure strategy equilibria of (?iim(l). 
Suppose {IA,IB) is a strict pure strategy Nash Equilibrium of G u m � such that 
lims-,i-Ili{lulj\ S) > lims-^i-'n.i{li,lj]S) for all k — li,i & {A,B} 
For large enough n, ! ! � ( / � ’ lj\ Sn) > ^iik, lj\ Sn) for all k {A, B} as 11,(Z^, h] S) is continu-. 
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ous in S. Thus, is a strict pure strategy Nash Equilibrium of This shows that the 
set of pure strategy equilibria of G{SN) converges to the set of pure strategy equilibria of Giim(l) 
if every pure strategy Nash Equilibrium of Giim(l) is strict. 
Similarly for the case of Sn 0+. • 
A.3.11 Proposition 3 
Proof . First, we show that {z,z) is an equilibrium of Giim(l). Notice that the definition of 2 
implies z > 1 ii h < ^(1 — I). 
Again, from the definition of we have ^ ^ > ^ - i and ^ + 5 > > ^ in the cases 
^ ^ + l and ^ > + l respectively. Altogether, we establish + 
Thus, Ui{z, z) = { r - - hz) > (r - c)(l — - |) > 0 = Ui{0, z). 
For a; > 1, we have Ui{z, z) - ni(a;, z) = [r - c){z 一 re) - h) . Suppose z > x-h 1, then 
Similarly, ^ ^ < ^ < h if x > z + 1. As we have Uiiz, z) ^ Iliix, z) in 
both cases, (z, z) is a Nash Equilibrium. 
We now show that generically, (z, z) is the unique equilibrium and also a strict Nash Equilibrium. 
First, suppose that there exist another symmetric equilibrium Ia = Ib — and n ^ z. It 
follows that nt(rc, n) — Ui{n, n) = (r - c){x - n) - /i) > 0 for all x^n. By considering the 
cases X = n + l and a; 二 n — 1’ we establish the necessary condition ^ + 5 > n > ^ — As the 
interval is of unit length and ^ + 5 > 2： > ^ - the only possible value for n is 呆 + 圣.Such 
case occurs only if z = ^ — This necessary condition can also be expressed as h =。⑵？厂/】^ ”. 
where 閱 > 1. 
We then consider a Nash Equilibrium (IaJb ) with f^ i > Zs 2 1 for G u m � . T h e optimality 
conditions Ua{Ia,Ib) > ^a{Ia 一 1,1b) and nsilAjh) > nsiUyh + 1) imply 
[E > > (Al) 
{IA + IB){IA + IB-1) - L - I - {IA + Ib){IA + IB + 1) � � . . 
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It follows that > (i^+t+i)'^ hence, /B + 1 > Ia. Together with U > h, we conclude 
that Ia == ZB + 1. Putting this result into (Al), we obtain the necessary condition h = 2(i:ii� 
where Ib is a positive integer. 
We have shown that Ui{z, z) ^ Hi (a;, z) for any x in C?um(l). The equality holds if and only if 
^ 二 [键]+ i and a; = ^ + 1. The condition 呆=[裙]+ I can be written as h = 2(2[镇+i) 
where 閱 > 1. 
Therefore, (z,z) is not a strict Nash Equilibrium and other equilibria arise only if h = 2(2n+i) 
for some positive integer n. As the necessary condition holds for a countable set of values of h only, 
Giini(l) has an unique and strict Nash Equilibrium(2；, z) generically. Result follows Lemma 9. • 
A.3.12 Proposition 4 
Proof . We first characterize the set of Equilibria of C7iim(0). Notice that for the case + 7 - 1 ^ 
Ia > Ib, H) = l{r-c){l-I)-KlB > c)(l-I)- KIa + LL{R - c){Ib 一 - = 
I l A { l A , h )朋 U = 2. Hence, this strategic profile cannot form an equilibrium, and deviation to 
such profile by firm A will never be optimal for any (UJB)-
For Non-degenerate equilibria, only the symmetric case needs to be considered. We now char-
acterize its existence condition. 
Let (n, n) be a symmetric equilibrium and ！！办’ n) = 卜 c ) ( l 一 J) — Kn. Suppose n > 1，then 
the firms have the incentive to shut down all but one of its outlets as 11^(1, n) = {r - c){l-1) - K 
or — c) ( / (n — 1) + 1 — / ) — K, which always exceeds UA{n,n). Therefore, the only possible 
symmetric equilibrium is (1,1), and 11^(1,1) > 0 = n>i(0,1). The existence condition for the 
symmetric equilibrium is derived from 1 ) < 1 1 ^ ( 1 , 1 ) where Ia > 7 . 
As nA(m, 1) = (r - c ) / ( l — I) — Km, we restrict our attention to the choice Ia = [7] + 1 , where 
[x] is the greatest integer less than x. The existence condition of the equilibrium (1,1) is then given 
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by 
UA{IA, 1) = ( r - c ) / ( l - I ) - KIA < \{R - c ) ( l - I) - K = UA{1, 1) 
which is equivalent to 
{ l - I ) { I - \ ) < h [ j ] (A2) 
In the case U > B^ + j - l , as Ub{Ia,h) = ( r - c ) ( l - / ) - K I b for any U + l - } > h > 0 and 
UAIH, H) = {R- - KIA for all IA> H + J - I, the strict monotonicity implies that 
IB = 1 and IA = [ j ] + 1 in equilibrium. As we have shown that 11^(1,1) > 11^(771,1) if j ^ m > 1, 
it is sufficient to consider the deviation Ia = 1-
It is straightforward to show that TIA{IA, 1) ^ 11^(1,1) if and only if 
{ l - I ) { I - \ ) > h [ ] ] (A3) 
As the right hand side of (A3) is strictly positive, then I e (^,1) if firm A does not reduce its 
number of outlet to one. In this case, j € (1，2) and Ia — 2. (A3) is then rewritten as > 
h. This is satisfied when / G [f - ^ ^ - h, f + y/^-h] and 
As 115(2,1) > 115(2,ZB) for any Ib ^ I HI e (|，1)，firm B's strategy is optimal. Therefore, 
the strategy profile (2,1) is an equilibrium when (1 - I){I - D > h. When (1 - I){I - 5) < /i, 
condition (A2) is always satisfied, so the symmetric strategy profile (1,1) is the unique equilibrium 
in such setting. 
If conditions (A2) and (A3) are replaced with strict inequality, then all deviations will be strictly 
unprofitable. In this case, the unique Nash Equilibrium of GiimCO) is the set of pure strategy 
equilibria when S —> 0+. _ 
A.3.13 Proposition 5 
Proof. We show this result by comparing the profit level of the firms in various settings. -
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In the case of obfuscation, the firms share the same profit level IF = ^(r - c)(l - I) - Kz. 
Without obfuscation, we have to consider the two types of equilibria stated in Proposition 4. 
For the symmetric case, 11^ = 11^ = ^(r - c)(l - I ) - K> 11° asz>l when h < ^{！ - I). 
We then consider an equilibrium {Ia, h ) = (2，1). Proposition 4 states that such type of equilibria 
exists only i f / > i + T h e n , UB = {r - c){l -1) - K > and HA = (r - c ) / ( l - I ) - 2 K > 
i ( r — c ) ( l - I ) - K + h{r-c)-K>U^. 
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